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ABSTRACT
Latinos in the United States are a diverse group, and their growing presence and
recent elections illustrate the importance of understanding and recognizing their
distinct political identities. The political identity of Cuban immigrants has been
understood as being an anomaly among Latino groups and is largely referred to as an
outlier in research of Latin American immigration. The intent of this thesis is to explore
the question of why some Latin American immigrants relate to a greater Latino identity.
Linked fate is identified as a relevant concept that addresses the formation of group
identity. From the literature, transnational connections and period of arrival are
expected to be determinant factors in an individual’s perception of linked fate. A
logistical regression analysis is conducted with data from the 2006 Latino National
Survey, and the results suggest that both transnational ties and immigration generation
are positive predictors for linked fate. The thesis concludes by finding similarities with
linked fate predictors in past studies and suggests that several similarities exist between
Cubans and other ethnic groups regarding linked fate.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In many ways, we can see why a general identity for Latin American immigrants
and Hispanic individuals is likely to exist. Within the United States, many Latinos of
different national origin speak the same language, listen to similar musical styles and
artists, and watch the same news or television channels. Shared characteristics such as
these can be traced to the fact that many Latin American countries share similar and
connected histories. As a result, people from these countries have similar interests and
concerns that continue into the current day. All of these factors appear to be the basis of
a Latino voting bloc that has been perceived as trending towards the Democratic.
Remarkably, this voting bloc has been predicted to grow in numbers and strength in
upcoming elections due to an increasing percentage of Latinos throughout the United
States (Igielnik & Budiman 2020).
Given the incredible diversity of Latin American nations and culture, it should
also not be surprising that Latinos share large differences. Just as with other groups,
Latinos are divided by several factors, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and age
(Rakich & Thomson-DeVeaux 2020). The differences across nationalities may fracture
the group as a voting bloc, making a Latino identity a less unified and reliable source of
partisan votes. It is also very much possible that superficial similarities of culture
language do not translate to shared political beliefs. Acknowledging such divisions has
become increasingly important as recent elections demonstrate the volatility of Latinos
as a political group. Within the most recent 2020 U.S. election, the Democratic
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candidate Joe Biden underperformed relative to the last election cycle – losing a large
amount of votes in some Texan Mexican American counties, as well as the county with
most of Florida’s Cuban Americans (DeVeaux, Skelley & Bronner 2020).
Understandably, there are many possible questions about the consistency of a Latin
American vote if such deviations are possible and threaten the overall trend of political
partisanship. It appears that understanding the nature and factors of Latin American
political identity continues to be of interest in the study of immigration politics and
political behavior. The Democratic underperformance with a predominantly Cuban
American district may seem surprising, however important considerations about this
demographic are revealed upon closer inspection.
Cuban Americans occupy an interesting space in the conversation of Latin
American immigration within the United States: despite their relatively small numbers,
they have a concentrated demographic presence in the state of Florida as well as a
distinct political identity. This tends to give Cuban Americans the label of being an
“outlier” among Latin American immigrant groups, as they express distinctly different
beliefs and behavior from what is associated with the traditional Latin American
political identity. Generally, the causes of these differences are intuitively apparent and
uncontroversial. This includes the role of contextual history of revolutionary Cuba, as
well as U.S. policy during the cold war as being determinant of how Cuban American
exile community might differ in significant ways from other immigrant groups. Their
immigration seemingly being primarily political rather than economic likely entails a
strong ideological component that will cross over into political life. In this sense, it is
2

expected that Cuban Americans might differ in what is considered Latino linked fate, or
belief in a shared identity and experience despite specific nationality that has been
observed as growing in the landscape of Latino immigration politics.
However, there is also reason to believe that this distinct Cuban identity can
blend with a greater Latino identity. As relevant history and context becomes relatively
further from the present day, new generations of immigrants face new problems within
a new political landscape that deviate from past historical context. Likewise, global
interconnectedness and communication has changed dramatically in recent years,
enabling immigrants to maintain ties to their country of origin in new ways. Indeed,
evidence has shown that Cuban Americans have shifted in perspective in a myriad of
ways in recent years, which may indicate that the Cuban American community as
beginning to share characteristics more like the general Latino immigrant identity.
The apparent distinctiveness of Cubans from other Latinos provides an
interesting perspective from which we can evaluate how Latinos form a shared sense of
identity. Certain concepts such as linked fate and transnationalism emerge in the
literature of immigration politics that supports the possibility that Latinos can form a
shared identity, and that there is a basis for shared experiences. The key question is as
follows: why do some immigrants feel linked fate more than others? In the following
literature review, several factors will be explored as potential indicators of this shared
identity. Additional dimensions such as transnational ties and generational change,
among other variables, will be explored in their role in influencing attitudes of linked
fate. In addition, this thesis seeks to test for indicators of linked fate among Cuban
3

immigrants in order to identify key similarities and differences from past studies. If
comparisons are consistent, it may indicate the potential for Cubans to engage with a
greater Latino immigrant identity.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Linked Fate and Group Identity
The concept of linked fate in politics emerges from Dawson’s seminal work,
Behind the Mule. Focusing on the group identity African Americans, the book seeks to
address competing theories of class and racial identity as proxies for political beliefs and
behavior, and consequently gives evidence to believe the latter is predominant in
shaping African American political thought. According to Dawson (1994), the evidence
indicates that a shared history of economic and social turmoil causes relative unity in
political interests for African Americans. The concept of linked fate arises when
considering how African Americans might connect their own experience with those who
face similar problems of racial injustice. Though African Americans as a group are
uniquely positioned for this analysis due to an extensive history of unique oppression,
this framework for analysis that emphasizes group identification as a proxy for politics
has been expanded to consider other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. Dawson’s work,
as will be explored in subsequent paragraphs, has been influential in the discussion of
Latino group identity as it relates to political interests in the United States.
Determinants of group consciousness have also been explored in an article by
Allen, Dawson, and Brown (1989), which suggests that there are numerous dimensions
by which a racial belief system might arise. Both low education and low socioeconomic
class are found to positively impact solidarity with the notion of black masses.
Religiosity was theorized to be additionally impactful due to advocating unity and
shared struggle in Black church’s gospel, however the findings are inconsistent.
5

Religious heterogeneity is speculated to be the reason for this, which is validated by a
later study McDaniel, Dwidar, and Calderon (2018). Although Black churches served a
role in civil rights and social justice causes that oriented religiosity towards group
consciousness, this is has not maintained over time. The divergence of religious beliefs
in the decades after the civil rights era has accounted for divergence in political beliefs.
These different approaches to faith, such as “social gospel, prosperity gospel, and Black
religion theology”, suggest different views of group identity and linked fate respectively
(McDaniel, Dwidar, & Calderon 2018, 274) Though this study disputes religion as being
homogenous and analogous to a singular black identity, it does reinforce the notion that
a type religious belief can correspond with attitudes of linked fate if enables certain
visions of community within the racial and ethnic group. The religious beliefs of Latinos
are mostly Christian with a majority being Roman Catholic, although there is
increasingly diversity of Christian denominations: see figure 1. These investigations into
causes for group consciousness and linked fate among African Americans have
contributed to the basis for exploring the concept as it pertains to other racial and ethnic
groups.
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Figure 1: Religious Affiliation of Hispanics in 2013
Source: Pew Research Center, 2014
The concept of linked fate and group consciousness, which brings immigrants of
different national origin to share similar political concerns, has been explored before as
being a large component of Latino political identity. Barreto and Pedraza (2009) affirm
the prevalence of Latino group identity using data from the 2006 Latino National
Survey, in correcting flaws of past data. Their findings demonstrate much stronger
political unity in partisanship as opposed to the non-Hispanic population. This signifies
that linked fate is particularly relevant and significant in assessing Latino politics.
Additionally, a study by Garcia-Rios and Barreto (2016) suggests that a large motivator
for Latino political participation is based on a politicized immigrant identity constructed
through news media. Linked fate is relevant to the construction of this politicized
immigrant identity, and Spanish media consumption has been noted to be a significant
7

indicator for linked fate among Cubans, according to Masuoka (2006). Similar to other
studies (Grenier 2006 and Mirilovic & Pollock 2018), this article also accounts for the
Cuban American exile origins as an exception that experienced higher political
participation relative to other Latino groups. While this source does not focus on Cuban
immigrants, it does assess the extent to which immigration’s prevalence in the national
dialogue brought attention towards a Latino political identity. This research prompts
several questions in regard to my investigation, such as the extent to which Cuban
immigrants identify with linked fate and whether their exception from a larger
politicized immigrant identity stems from sustained attachment or interest in country of
origin politics.
Masuoka (2006) engages with the growing literature of linked fate to establish
the presence of pan-ethnic consciousness among immigrant groups in a comparative
sense. Both socioeconomic status, native born, and discrimination seem to be positive
indicators for pan-ethnic consciousness in Hispanics. This emphasis on discrimination
can support the notion that newer immigrants may have higher linked fate perception,
although the positive indicator for Cubans natively born in the United States could
signify that later immigration generation may be less of a predictor for linked fate than
otherwise expected. Masuoka also highlights Cubans in the study, noting that they
exhibited particularly high attitudes of linked fate relative to other Latinos, and
concludes it is based on contextual factors such as their strong cultural ties as well as
Spanish media consumption given their unique demographic concentration.
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Sanchez and Vargas (2016) build on the concept of linked fate on political
consciousness by highlighting the key similarities in linked fate as it exists in African
American and Latino communities in the U.S. based on shared perceptions of
discrimination. However, contrary to some conclusions drawn by Barreto and Pedraza,
this study finds less indicators of very strong Latino linked fate and concludes that it is
not analogous to the form of shared consciousness within African American
communities, due to cultural boundaries. Exploring different groups with differences in
nationality, political experience, and transnational ties might provide a comparative
basis for how linked fate differs between groups. Furthermore, the concept of linked fate
as a concept within African Americans has been questioned as well. Gay, Hochschild,
and White (2016) contend that group identification based on race or ethnicity is
becoming less indicative of political beliefs than before, and class is increasingly
becoming a signifier for group identity. This negation in findings suggests that linked
fate as a concept relating to ethnic identity may be more complex or less relevant of a
predictor than previously understood and warrants further examination.
Identifying a Transnational Approach
In the study of immigration, transnationalism found prominence as scholars
began considering new approaches of how migrants might integrate and maintain ties
between nations, departing from traditional perspectives such as assimilation theory.
Assimilation theory had held a long-standing influence on the literature, but through the
later part of the 20th century, declined in relevance. In seeking alternatives that might
offer a more complex framework of migration, Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton
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(1992) argued in favor of a transnational approach for international politics, identifying
the approach as enabling more detailed analysis of migration flows and its impact on
both sending and receiving countries. The advantage of this model over assimilation
theory is that it considers the agency of migrants in constructing and maintaining ties of
culture, rather than primarily working towards integration of a dominant one.
However, while transnationalism was accepted as a valuable alternative and grew
considerably in the literature, perspectives on the concept of assimilation developed as
well. In their 2003 book Remaking the American Mainstream, Alba and Nee
acknowledged limitations of the assimilation model, and put forward the notion of
assimilation of a process that could take multiple forms; “boundary crossing, boundary
blurring, and boundary shifting” (2003, 60). This distinction enables the concept of
assimilation to remain while admitting the multi-dimensional nature of shifting cultural
and demographic dynamics that gave weight to the transnational approach. Thus, rather
than appearing as opposing ideologies on the nature of immigration, the concepts of
transnationalism and assimilation appear to be compatible.
Additionally, some immigration scholarship has put forth an understudied
alternative in the notion of dissimilation in the context of immigration. It is, in a sense,
an extension of assimilation intended to estimate the differences that arise between a
migrant group and their country of origin. Fitzgerald (2013) addressed the question of
dissimilation among Mexican immigrants in How Migrants Impact Their Homelands
and concludes that there is evidence to suggest that migrant behavior changes when
they return to their country of origin as a result of their outside experiences. Notably,
10

Fitzgerald acknowledges that hometown associations and remittances act as a
counterbalance that can prevent dissimilation by strengthening transnational ties (2013,
132-133). The basis of this approach helps address how this research might expect
Cuban Americans to associate with their country of origin. From the body of literature
encompassing theories of immigration, such as assimilation and transnationalism, we
can further understand how migrants develop, maintain, or lose connections to their
country across borders.
Indicators of Transnationalism
Remittances serve as a primary example of how transnational ties might be
expressed among immigrant communities. As discussed, remittances through
hometown associations have been identified as a positive indicator for transnational
connections in the case of Mexican immigration (Fitzgerald 2013). Logically, navigating
through channels and barriers of transferring money and maintaining communication
indicate that remittances carry an implication of transnational ties and commitment.
The extent to which remittances might influence behavior and impact immigrant
communities is therefore relevant to the study of Cuban American transnationalism.
However, current literature on Cuban remittances vary on analysis and conclusions.
Certain economic studies, such as Orozco and Hansin (2011) suggest that remittances
have a significant role in encouraging economic development and sustaining
households, supporting the notion that transnational ties can have sociopolitical
ramifications, such as economic initiatives and entrepreneurship in Cuba. This
highlights the importance of understanding the political implications of immigrants who
11

maintain transnational ties, as their relations and connections may encourage certain
political beliefs and behavior.
However, specific studies regarding effects and contributors to Cuban American
remittance sending are limited by scope of economic data and contradicting claims. This
case that is not necessarily exclusive to Cuba as remittance data has generally been
considered difficult to measure for other countries, however conditions particular to
Cuba might provide additional limitations. In 2005, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López
analyzed the existing studies on Cuban remittances and found the current estimates to
be inaccurate due to inconsistent data and methodologies. Additionally, the difficulty of
measuring Cuban remittance data is complicated by Cuba’s lack of transparency and
inadequate research efforts to conduct large-scale surveys. The difficulty of assessing
accurate numbers indicates that making claims on comprehensive numbers of
remittances with existing data is prone to error. However, this does not negate the
possibility that valid conclusions can be drawn by studying determinants of remittance
sending in proportional disparity between senders rather than making claims of precise
amounts.
Regarding the demographic elements of remittance sending, Díaz-Briquets and
Pérez-López (1997) contend that the nature of remittance behavior is dependent the
status of the migrant community as refugees rather than voluntary immigrants.
Furthermore, contextual policy and economic conditions are potential major
disincentives to individuals who plan to remit to their country of origin. The article
includes a comparative analysis of Cuban and Nicaraguan remittance data, suggesting
12

that the countries’ similar history, comparing the 1960s Cuban revolution with the late
1970s and 1980s Sandinista government. Both communist-inspired movements appear
to produce similar remittance behavior within the migrant groups. Although more than
two decades have passed since, Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López establish important
considerations in the study of remittance behavior, including the role of policy
incentives and disincentives on migrant behavior and comparisons between migrant
groups.
Furthermore, Blue (2004) studied remittances to Cuba and determined that
several factors positively influenced remittance sending. Among these factors,
prominent ones included economic crisis, immediate relatives, and recent visits by the
sender to the home country. Notably, the data of this study was taken from a 2000
Havana survey of Cuban households, supplemented with interviews, collecting data
from the remittance receivers rather than senders. While Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López
(1997) argued that political disincentives and refugee identity would decrease
remittance sending as immigrants integrated into a new country, Blue’s data
demonstrated the opposite. In addition, according to her findings, older immigrants
remitted more often, and in greater amounts. Given contradictory findings in the study
of this subject, further research is warranted to estimate the disparity of transnational
ties among immigrants.
Political Identity and Transnationalism
Transnational ties can be demonstrated through more than just remittances.
Political behavior and identity can also indicate whether an immigrant is significantly
13

interested and involved with their country of origin, and political attitudes can move
through transnational channels of communication. Similar to Díaz-Briquets and PérezLópez, Grenier (2006) focuses on the unique identity Cuban immigrants adopt as
refugees and exiles, and its consequences. Using multiple public opinion surveys
conducted in different years, Grenier analyzes Cuban American political and social
attitudes and behavior to determine whether the Cuban exile ideology had a
determinant effect on policy preference and political affiliation. At the time, 69 percent
of Cubans in Miami identified as Republicans, contrasting with 17 percent that identify
as Democrats. The significant Republican affiliation among Cuban Americans is the
strongest indication that an “exile ideology” persists over a general immigrant identity
which finds itself aligning with Democratic policy goals. Grenier concludes that,
although a semblance of an “exile ideology” is prominent across responses, the specific
policy and political considerations tend to be varied and often appears contradictory
with previous responses. Grenier also finds that later waves and further geographical
groups of Cuban Americans are often more willing to compromise and negotiate with
the Castro regime than those residing in Miami.
Generational divisions on politics within immigrant groups serves as a focus for
this research as there are potential of generational differences in linked fate as well as
transnational ties. Using 2004 election survey data, DeSipio and Uhnlaner (2007)
studied generational differences of Mexican American voting preferences and found that
generation did appear to be a contributing factor in voting preference, although this
effect varied between demographics. Controlling for partisanship, generation was found
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to be as significant as an indicator as party for perception of the candidates, and the gap
between the candidates increased as generation increased. The generational divide for
partisanship was not linear, however this was predicted based on a theory of secondgeneration exceptionalism which posits that second generations express more loyalty to
U.S. values than other generations. Furthermore, Eckstein (2004) identifies that there
are major differences between Cuban immigrant cohorts, and suggests that those who
arrived before 1964 are part of a “privileged” group that had the means to escape the
revolution, while immigrants after 1980 are of a more diverse set of workers and
laborers who became disillusioned and disaffected with the government. Eckstein
suggests this “proletarianized” cohort as being antithetical in character to the early
immigrants. This shift is marked by the Mariel Boatlift mass-exodus in 1980. Eckstein
(2004) and DeSipio and Uhnlaner (2007) indicate it possible and even likely that
generational divisions exist within Cuban Americans. These generational divides, I
believe, could be derived from differences in transnational ties and finked fate identity.
Existing literature has explored interest in country of origin politics and political
identity. Mirilovic and Pollock (2018) argue that the sharp partisan divide in policy and
rhetoric in the U.S. determines country of origin interest among immigrant groups.
Using data from the 2012 American National Election Study, the study explores relevant
survey responses among U.S. citizens of various national origins, both native and
foreign born. Statistical analysis suggests that identification with Republican party
coincided with lower interest in country of origin politics, and furthermore that
generational divides did not demonstrably lower transnational ties. The article
15

highlights a notable exception in Cuban Americans, indicating that their Republican
identity is consistent with transnational ties due to contextual factors, such as countryspecific policy and history. This appears to coincide with the findings and analysis of
Grenier (2006), where Cuba’s unique Republican affiliation relates to country of origin
interest, as it appeals to the greater “exile ideology” and desire for targeted anti-Castro
Cuba policy. Furthermore, this confirms findings by Masuoka (2006) which indicate
that the unique Cuban Republican identity contributes to linked fate where it would
otherwise negatively affect other groups, as with transnationalism.

16

Party Identification, % of Hispanics in Each Group

Figure 2: Party Identification by Percent of Hispanics
Source: Pew Research Center, 2014
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Considerations of political identity and partisanship are therefore relevant for the
discussion of transnationalism as factor in understanding other beliefs, such as linked
fate, in a population of Cuban immigrants. Of course, no voting bloc based on national
identity is uniform. Even though increased Republican identity has sharply
differentiated Cubans from other Latinos, there remains much political variation within
all groups. A Pew Research Study (2014) analyzes survey data to find that more Cubans
identify or lean towards the Democratic party, though they maintain the largest percent
of Republicans relative to other Latinos: see figure 2. The authors of the study are
careful to note, however, that among those registered to vote, Cubans are registered with
the Republican party more than the Democratic party, 47% to 44% respectively (Pew
Research Center, 2014, 129). This study suggests that Cuban political identity and
partisanship is more complicated than upon initial inspection. Cubans do maintain a
unique degree of Republican affiliation, however the degree of this may be overstated
and uncertain among other Latinos. Analyzing such dimensions of the demographics
may indicate more similarities between Cubans and non-Cuban Latinos in other
unexplored forms of identity, such as linked fate.
Transnational ties have also been found to have consequences on political
identity on non-migrant citizens in the country of origin. Duquette-Rury, Waldinger and
Lim (2018) assessed the consequences of international migration ties in Mexico utilizing
survey data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study. They found that having migrant
connections, through social ties and remittances, had a positive relationship to political
interest, as well as being more critical of the election process. This indicates the
18

importance of transnational connections and remittances in political interest and
behavior. Though this research focuses on Mexico, the principle of social remittances
might extend to other migrants who maintain social ties across borders. Additionally,
this research appears to support the findings put forward by Orozco and Hansin (2011),
that remittances could have a transformative effect on politics and beliefs the receiving
country.
Shifting Policy and Relations
A significant component to both the study of remittances to Cuba and political
attitudes of Cuban Americans is the reality that both are substantially impacted by the
context which immigrants arrive in (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López 1998, Blue 2004,
Grenier 2006). The creation of these circumstances is very much reflected by ongoing
diplomatic relations and policy changes between the United States and Cuba. This is
especially important, provided that this historical origin has been acknowledged to form
a unique basis for Cuban American identity that separates it from other Latin American
identity (Mirilovic and Pollock 2018, Garcia-Rios and Barreto 2016). Following in that
tradition of the literature, it is worth considering how we can imagine these impacts on
transnational ties relating to specific policy shifts and periods in history.
Identifying the need for such research, Eckstein and Barberia (2002) conducted a
survey of Cuban American community leaders to identify generational disparities in
transnational ties as they relate to the historical context of that immigration. They found
that the earliest immigration waves opposed transnational visits as their migration was
related on political opposition informed by cold war sentiment, while the second wave of
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Cuban migrants were more grounded on economic reasons as opposed to ideological.
U.S. arrivals from Cuba after-1980 are concluded as being more likely to have family
that still remained on the island, indicating that there is more basis to maintain
transnational ties. Furthermore, Eckstein and Barberia conclude that despite travel
policy becoming restrictive from in 1994 with the U.S.-Cuba migration agreement, visits
continued to increase and have an “eroding” effect on Cuban state control, economic or
otherwise. This article provides a basis to believe in disparities between Cuban
Americans relating to transnational ties and concurs with Díaz-Briquets and PérezLópez’s (1998) findings that such disparity can occur from circumstance of immigration
and contradicts Blue’s findings that older immigrants harbor deeper attachment and
commitment to country of origin. Furthermore, the conclusion that international
impacts can be driven by migration ties have significant implication in demonstrating
the relevance of transnationalism as an area of political research.
Similarly considering waves and generations of immigration, Grenier (2017) used
aggregated results from several years of polling data to conclude that preferences
towards engagement policies increased among later waves of Cuban migration as
opposed hardline isolationist measures. Once more, this would suggest that generations
of Cuban Americans are divided politically in attitudes regarding U.S.-Cuban relations,
as a potential consequence of different historical experiences of shifting policy.
Furthermore, one can expect party identification to contribute to some of disparities on
policy preferences regarding country of origin, as indicated by Mirilovic and Pollock
(2018). Notably absent from this analysis, however, is the consideration of how
20

transnational ties, such as remittances and visitation, affect or account for such
differences. Transnational ties are necessarily maintained through engagement, which
could suggest some tension between those who are immigrants and transnationals and
the belief that contact and engagement with Cuba should be limited and restricted in a
political sense. Given this unresolved question, the literature on transnationalism’s
impacts on the Cuban population remains somewhat inconclusive and warrants further
examination.
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CHAPTER III: EXPECTATIONS AND METHOD
Overall, the body of literature that provides the basis for this thesis is composed
from a body of knowledge that is diverse in topic, purpose, and conclusions. Relative to
other demographics, studies into Cuban Americans, immigrants, and populations are
limited in quantity and scope. As such, insight and expectations are drawn from the
conclusions of studies that differ in focus of racial and ethnic identity. Previous research
into African American linked fate can highlight certain variables that contribute to
linked fate (Allen, Dawson, & Brown 1989; Dawson 2004; Sanchez & Vargas 2016;
McDaniel, Dwidar, & Calderon 2018). Likewise, existing immigration literature has
explored transnationalism in Latino populations from other countries, such as Mexico,
and in general (DeSipio & Uhnlaner 2007; Fitzgerald 2013; Duquette-Rury, Waldinger,
& Lim 2018). Thus, the concept of linked fate is largely unexplored in the context of
Cuban immigration. However, past studies of linked fates that focus on other
nationalities and populations can inform the predictor variables of this model. In doing
this, differences or continuities in the Cuban immigration experience can be
understood.
This thesis seeks to answer the question as to why some immigrants express
linked fate more than others. Between Cuban immigrants and other Latino groups,
there is reason to expect to find greater convergence of shared Latino identity among
later immigration waves than earlier ones. If later generations of Cubans share a profile
that is more in line with a shared immigrant experience, it can expected to be a positive
indicator that later generations of Cuban Americans are more likely to align with linked
22

fate or a greater Latino identity. Given these considerations, I put forward the following
hypotheses:
H1: Cuban immigrants with transnational ties to their homeland will
express attitudes of linked fate or pan-Latino identity.
H2: Later generations of Cuban immigrants will express attitudes of linked
fate or pan-Latino identity.
H3: Later generations of Cuban immigrants and Cuban immigrants with
transnational ties will express higher attitudes of linked fate or pan-Latino
identity.
Using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (n=8,634) by Fraga et al., a
sample of 341 self-identified Cuban immigrants are relevant for the analysis of this
study. No native-born Cuban Americans are analyzed in this model to test for effects of
date of arrival. The model will be constructed using an ordered logistic regression to
conduct a multivariate analysis. All variables in this study were transformed for
analytical purposes from the dataset. The dependent variable, linked fate, can be
operationalized using responses regarding perceptions of intra-Latino relations and
perception of pan-ethnicity. While the 2006 Latino National Survey provides several
different types questions regarding pan-Latino identity and linked fate, the model was
constructed using a variable from the most relevant question. For a more detailed
explanation on the creation and transformation of the variables in the model and the
wording of the questions and responses within the survey, see Appendix 1. For tables
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and figures that illustrate the distribution of responses within each variable used in the
model, see Appendix 2.
The variable for transnationalism can be operationalized using an aggregate of
relevant responses designated under the “transnationalism” section of the survey
design, including questions regarding sending money, visitation, and contact to their
country of origin. The resulting composite variable was then collapsed into a dummy
variable, indicating between no transnational connections or some transnational
connections. Effects for transnationalism affecting group identity follow from the
findings of Duquette-Rury, Waldinger and Lim (2018) that suggest transnationalism can
influence political identity. As identified in the alternative hypotheses, this is expected
to have a positive effect on attitudes of linked fate due to the effect of strengthening the
immigration identity that prevents dissimilation, as suggested by Fitzgerald (2013). The
variable for immigration generation can be operationalized using responses to year of
arrival to create a dummy variable, indicating whether they arrived before or after the
Mariel boatlift in 1980. The relevance of this variable will test the significance of the
historical event in transforming the group identity of Cuban immigrant population as
theorized by Eckstein (2004), and furthermore the effects of generational differences as
identified by Grenier (2017). Based on the literature, there is an expected positive effect
for this variable.
An ordinal household income variable was utilized as an additional control
variable, as the literature has indicated that questions of wealth and class are relevant to
immigration cohorts and linked fate attitudes. There is an expectation of higher income
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positively relating to more perceptions of linked fate, based on findings by Dawson
(1994) and Masuoka (2006). Age group is included in the model as it is expected to
positively correlate with transnationalism, as Blue (2004) indicates that older
immigrants remitted more, thus exhibiting a greater tendency to maintain certain
transnational ties.
Furthermore, inferring from Dawson (1994), Masuoka (2006), and Garcia-Rios
and Barreto (2016), a greater Latino identity possibly will be concurrent with nationally
politized beliefs, which can form from shared experiences of discrimination, politically
imposed barriers between countries, and media consumption. A control variable for
Spanish media preference is used in the model, which is predicted to positively relate to
linked fate. An additional predictor variable in perceived discrimination was also
utilized in the ordered logistic model. A composite variable was created using the
variables indicating discrimination, varying from 0 to a maximum of 4 areas of
perceived discrimination. A variable for naturalized citizens is utilized to test for effects
of national assimilation on transnationalism. Education is included in the model as a
standard control variable. The literature indicates that younger generations of Cubans
favor “engagement” policies (Grenier 2017), suggesting that policy preferences towards
immigration are becoming more open than restrictive. To test for this, an ordinal
variable measuring support for open immigration policy is included in the model.
Research such as Eckstein and Barberia (2002) argue that the generational divide
is making Cuban immigrate for more economic than ideological reasons that were
prominent during the cold war. From this, a dummy variable testing for economic
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reasons for migration is also included in the model, with the expectation that will
increase linked fate due to aligning the Cuban immigrant experience closer with the
average immigrant experience. Self-reported skin tone is operationalized in the model
as a corollary to race and class, as race data within the survey was insufficient at
providing any delineation. See Appendix 1 for further explanation. As Eckstein (2004)
suggests, the cohort that emerged from the Mariel boatlift immigration wave
corresponded with a more racially diverse distribution of migrants. From this, we can
expect this to both impact effects of discrimination and year of arrival. A dummy
variable for Republican affiliation was constructed using party identification to test for
effects of partisan policy preferences, as explored by Grenier (2006, 2017) and Mirilovic
and Pollock (2018). Given the demonstrated capacity for Republican identity to focus on
limiting engagement with Cuba and focusing on Cuba’s unique exile identity among
Latino groups, a negative effect on linked fate is expected among Cubans who choose to
identify with the Republican party over the Democratic party.
Religiosity will be included in the analysis to determine whether a community
oriented dedicated to church attendance results in an increased of linked fate, as is
found among certain African American gospels (McDaniel, Dwidar, & Calderon 2018).
The distribution of religion within this sample is significantly more catholic than the
2013 Pew Research study would suggest, meaning that it is expected to have a more
uniform effect than if religious affiliation were more fragmented. Refer to Appendix 2
for more information on the profile of the sample population as they compare to the
recent Pew Research findings among Hispanics.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As discussed previously, the primary objective of this study is to determine
predictors of linked fate for Cuban American immigrants. An ordered logistic model was
used to calculate the effects that numerous independent variables had on degree of
linked fate, as shown in Table 1. The model includes a total of n=180 observations after
omitting all respondents who had at least 1 missing response among the variables. The
results indicate that the presence of transnational ties was positively related with
increased attitudes of linked fate at a significance level of 0.05. This corresponds with
the model expectations. Likewise, individuals who arrived in the U.S. after 1980
expressed higher attitudes of linked fate than individuals who arrived prior to 1980 at a
stricter significance level of 0.01. This also corresponds with the expectations that later
arrivals are more likely share an identity with other Latinos based on a recent
experience with immigration. Removing the transnational variable does not seem to
negatively affect the relationship of post-1980 migration on linked fate and removing
post-1980 migration likewise does not seem to diminish the effect of transnationalism
on linked fate. However, the other predictor variables were found to be less significant
as a result. This may suggest that both transnationalism and post-1980 arrival are
significant predictors independent of one another, however together they give more
predicting strength to the model overall.
Perceived discrimination was found to positively relate to linked fate, although to
a lesser degree than transnational ties and time of arrival. This confirms prior research
that finds discrimination as a predictor for group identity and linked fate (Dawson 1994,
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Masuoka 2006, and Garcia-Rios & Barreto 2016). Furthermore, the inclusion of
discrimination of the model increased the effects of transnational ties, year of arrival,
Spanish media consumption, and age group. This suggests that discrimination is a key
control variable for the model. Household income demonstrated only a slight positive
relationship with linked fate at a 0.1 significance level. Though this is not the most
robust finding, this would seem to disprove notions that low economic class would
differentiate recent immigrants, and that class is a barrier to group identity such as
linked fate (Eckstein 2004). Thus, the results did not match the expectations established
in the methods. The inclusion of household income did, however, increase the
relationship of transnationalism to attitudes of linked fate, further indicating that level
of income may not be a hindrance to attitudes of linked fate.
Age group has a substantial positive relationship with linked fate at the strictest
significant level of 0.01, just as with year of arrival. This provides further evidence
towards the effect of later generational differences on reflecting an immigrant identity
that deviates further from the Cuban exception and more in line with what is
understood as the more general Latino immigrant experience, as explored by Grenier
(2017). It is interesting to note that age group’s inclusion in the model significantly
increased the effects of post-1980 arrival from .2855855 to 1.078412, and similarly
improved the impact on transnationalism by a decent amount, increasing the
relationship coefficient from .7415182 to .8983263. The latter effect appears to confirm
findings by Blue (2004) that concluded older immigrants remitted more, meaning the
increase of transnationalism among older groups could lead to greater attitudes in
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linked fate. It also notable that both age and recent arrivals are positively related with
linked fate, despite the large fact that recent arrivals tend to be younger. The data
indicates that both later arrivals and older immigrants have a positive effect, meaning
both contribute to linked fate despite the difference in overlap. Spanish media
consumption comprised of another strong positive indicator towards linked fate, with
the second highest effect among all variables at a significance level of 0.05. This affirms
the expectations based on the findings of Masuoka (2006) and Gracias-Rios and Barreto
(2018) which suggest that Spanish media plays a large role in the construction of linked
fate and a politicized immigrant identity. Indeed, it would appear to be the case that
Spanish media which is relied upon by a diverse set of Latino demographics would
contribute to the individual’s ability to identify with a shared set of experiences and
concerns, given they cover a wide range of issues that relate to Spanish speakers. The
effects of this variable’s inclusions are interesting, as it lowered the effect of both
transnationalism and post-Mariel boatlift arrival in predicting linked fate but increased
the significance and magnitude of effects from discrimination and income. This finding
is significantly related with linked fate and confirms expectations, despite seemingly
diluting the effects of transnationalism and immigration generation.
Naturalized citizenship was not found to a significant relationship with linked
fate, meaning that its effects cannot be determined within the model of this study. The
inclusion of this variable did somewhat lower the effect of transnationalism, from
.9254714 to .9104257. This seems to indicate that assimilation through naturalization
has a dampening effect on transnationalism, which aligns with the expectation.
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Education was divided into two dummy variables, testing for high school graduates and
individuals with some post-secondary education. The results do not seem to
significantly relate with linked fate. Furthermore, removing this variable from the model
also does not impact any statistically significant relationships apart from household
income, which is to be expected based on the typical relationship between education and
income level. Interestingly, immigration policy preference does not seem to indicate
linked fate necessarily, however its inclusion does affect the transnational relationship
with linked fate, changing the coefficient from .6876675 without immigration policy as a
variable to .9104257. Therefore, the immigration policy variable was a useful addition
for its effects among those with transnational ties, although it did not conform to
expectations.
Republican identity, as evident on Table 1, was a statistically insignificant
predictor of linked fate. Furthermore, it appears inclusion appears to have had a
negligible effect on the other variable’s coefficients or statistical significance. This fails
to confirm or deny the expectation that Republican identity has a negative effect on
linked fate. Economic motivations for immigration similarly had no significant effects
on linked fate, although the potential coefficient appears mostly positive within the
standard error. For the purposes of this study, however, the results are inconclusive.
Including this variable seems to have somewhat lessened the effect transnational ties on
linked fate from .955947 to .9104257. This goes against the expectations of the model
based on the literature.
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Testing for complexion as a corollary for race, we find that it is insignificant in
predicting linked fate. This variable was anticipated to impact both relationships of
discrimination and time of arrival on the model. Accounting for this variable did
increase the discrimination from .3978056 to .5668939, however surprisingly it did not
affect year of arrival’s relationship to linked fate, rather, it did increase the relationship
of transnational ties from .7451465 to .9104257. Furthermore, its presence appeared to
strengthen the relationship of Spanish media consumption, while also lowering the
significance of college education. These findings only partially match the expectation.
Finally, increased church attendance did not seem to correspond with increased
attitudes of linked fate. Furthermore, it only marginally appears to have increased both
effects of transnationalism and time of arrival. The effects of church attendance are
therefore do not match the expectations for the model.
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Table 1: Predictors of Linked Fate
COEFFICIENT

STD. ERROR

P-VALUE

Transnational ties**

.9104257

.3770858

0.016

Post-Mariel boatlift
arrival***

1.089219

.4007291

0.007

Discrimination**

.5668939

.2756248

0.040

Household income*

.1814245

.1026243

0.077

Age Group***

.5334189

.1362338

0.000

Spanish media
consumption**

1.052587

.4242936

0.013

Naturalized citizen

.3182422

.445933

0.475

Highschool graduate or
GED

-.1080311

.4440219

0.808

Some college or more*

-.5968487

.3558176

0.093

Open immigration
preference

-.169749

.1725121

0.325

Republican identity

.2106826

.3426954

0.539

Economic immigration

.4514585

.4976875

0.364

Light complexion

.188045

.3409983

0.581

Church attendance

.1216414

.1078108

0.259

Cut 1

4.352823

1.450472

Cut 2

4.966232

1.457805

Cut 3

6.382059

1.495884

Observations

180

Log Likelihood

-195.64062

Prob > chi2

0.0000

Pseudo R2

0.1279

Key: *= p < .1, **= p < .05, *** = p < .01
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
This study examines how transnationalism and immigration generation,
previously understood as affecting other political beliefs, can correspond to a shared
Latino identity with linked fate. Analysis of the model suggests that the presence of
transnational ties and being part of a later wave of Cuban immigration both positively
and significantly relates with increased attitudes of linked fate. The demonstrated
effects of transnationalism on linked fate within the model concurs with past studies
that suggest transnational ties influence the establishment of political and immigrant
identity (Fitzgerald 2013; Duquette-Rury, Waldinger, & Lim 2018). The effects of later
generations of Cuban immigrants supports the past studies indicating generational
differences as a predictor of different political attitudes (DeSipio & Uhnlaner 2007), and
seemed to follow from Eckstein’s (2004) indication that differences in Cuban
immigrants would be marked by the 1980’s Mariel boatlift.
The role of discrimination and Spanish media reliance within the model
furthermore affirm the notion that individual experiences of discrimination and
exposure to a Spanish media environment are influential to the formation of a linked
fate identity, as with household income as a predictor for socioeconomic status (Dawson
1994, Masuoka 2006, and Garcia-Rios & Barreto 2016). Age group was surprisingly
significant in results of the model, corresponding to expectations that older immigrants
have higher transnational ties (Blue 2004). Notably, this further provides evidence
against Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López (1997) who argue that political disincentives
discourage older immigrants from remitting and consequently expressing transnational
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ties and interests. The primary findings of transnationalism and generations are
particularly important because they go against some intuitive understandings we may
have regarding Cubans, from the literature or otherwise. One does not necessarily
maintain a Cuban exile identity by maintaining connections to a country which they
have immigrated from due to unique grievances. Rather, it is more likely that engaging
with difficulties of border crossing and facing barriers in contacting their family back
home provides a basis for Cubans to identify with other Latinos.
Notable departures from the expected results include the role of economic
immigration, which did not indicate a relationship towards linked fate as was theorized
based on findings established by Eckstein and Barberia (2002). Similarly, immigration
policy preferences did not relate with linked fate directly, although it did increase the
effect of transnationalism on linked fate. Furthermore, several variables were
indeterminate in their ability to predict linked fate or in significantly altering the
findings of the model, as with Republican identity, naturalization, education, and
church attendance. Complexion as a corollary for race only partially matched
expectation, as it increased the relationship of discrimination to linked fate but failed to
indicate the same increase in later immigration waves.
There are several limitations that can be anticipated from the data. First, the
2006 Latino National Survey data may not perfectly reflect the sample populations and
potential conclusions drawn from more recent studies on linked fates such as McDaniel,
Dwidar, and Calderon (2018) and Cuban Americans, such as and Grenier (2017). It is
also possible that the limited sample size, missing data and lack of response variation
34

within variables such as discrimination and economic immigration impose a limit on the
model’s predicting power. Although a decent sample size of 341 relevant cases were
available, the number of observations dropped significantly to 180 due to missing data
across numerous variables. It is possible that a statistical model that uses a method to
estimate missing variables could provide a more accurate relationship of the analyzed
variables.
Furthermore, inclusion of many dummy variables such as the presence of
transnationalism does not test for the variable in degrees. Future studies could
investigate into this variable further to assess the role of each transnational tie
specifically and with more detail. A more recent data set can be used to test for these
effects on linked fate in a modern context, where policy and engagement with Cuba has
changed even further. Additionally, an analysis of linked fate attitudes and the effects of
transnationalism in a longitudinal study could be examine how these variables change
within an individual over time.
Finally, it is important to consider that there are limited claims one can make
with the concept of linked fate. If certain criticisms from past studies are to be accepted
as valid, then the degree to which linked fate reflects the ability for Latino nationalities
to form a shared political consciousness is uncertain (Sanchez & Vargas 2016 and Gay,
Hochschild, & White 2016). Furthermore, as revealed by the 2014 Pew Research study,
it is likewise a mistake to assume that the presence of some linked fate equates to the
ability for a group to act unanimously. Equally noteworthy is that national and ethnic
groups and can differ within a group, and this discrepancy can change over time, as
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evident with party identification and religion in Latinos. There is merit to repeating a
perhaps overfamiliar reminder that ethnic groups are not monoliths: variation and
disparities within groups exists, regardless of any apparent trends or relationships.
Further research could explore how this sense of transnationalism’s relationship to
linked fate varies across other immigrant groups, as well as the influence of immigration
generations on linked fate. The study of Cubans relative to other Latinos is significant in
the study of politics, as they represent a political anomaly in the study of Latino
immigration.
As indicated in the introduction, understanding how a greater Latino identity is
constructed is of great importance considering the limitations of conceiving a Latino
voting bloc. Furthermore, the ways in which Cuban’s compare to other groups in linked
fate attitudes can provide insight on how to better understand Cuban American political
beliefs, interests, and behavior. The beliefs and behavior of this demographic are of
growing importance, considering their large concentration in Florida, which can be
politically consequential in local and national elections. Current research regarding
Cuban immigrants is lacking when compared to other Latino groups, meaning that there
are often disputed claims within the literature without clear resolution or consensus.
Based on the findings of this study, the reject the null hypothesis can be rejected
and the H3 hypothesis is accepted, which argues that individuals with transnational ties
and later generations of Cuban immigrants as indicating a higher expression of linked
fate. The findings of many of the additional variables impacts on linked fate are largely
inconclusive and warrant further examination. This research was intended to investigate
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the factors that make certain immigrants express linked fate more than others, and
consequently identified several predictors that appeared to indicate identification with
linked fate. Determining predictors of linked fate among Cuban immigrants has enabled
a comparison to different ethnic and immigrant groups. This study concludes that there
are many continuities in the measurement of Cuban linked fate as with other group
identities. Factors such as discrimination, Spanish media consumption, and
socioeconomic status reflect similarities in past inquiries into linked fate.
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APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND
TRANSFORMATION
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Table 2: Construction of the Linked Fate Dependent Variable
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RGFATE

How much does
your “doing well”
depend on other
Latinos/Hispanics
also doing well? A
lot, some, a little,
or not at all?

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

Lot

Linked fate

Some
Little
Nothing

Variable was reordered,
placing “Nothing” at a value
of “0”, scaling up to “Lot”
with a value of “3”.
Responses of “Don’t Know”
were omitted by recoding
them as missing data.

DK/NA

Note: “Don’t Know/Non-Applicable” responses were recoded to be missing data for all
questions
Although there were many variables included in the survey that used similar
wording, this variable was selected as the best measurement of linked fate. Other
variables in the dataset, such as “RGPCOMM” and “RGCOMM” had wording that fixated
on political or economic similarities between groups, while “RGFATE” was is the most
general in scope, simply indicating a sense of shared prospects across individual
experiences, which is closer to what the literature explores as linked fate. The response
distribution between the variables indicates that the difference in wording affected
individual responses. Furthermore, this question indicates a personal feeling of linked
fate, rather than other variables that measured whether they felt like Cubans in general
had a similar linked fate to other Latinos/Hispanics, such as “LATFATE”. This is
limiting, as respondents may consider their nationality as differing from the greater
Latino identity based on empirical differences rather than personal identification. Refer
to Table 3 for the list of unused variables.
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Table 3: Unused Variables for Linked Fate
SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY QUESTION

RGCOMM

Thinking about issues like job opportunities,
educational attainment or income, how much do
you have in common with other Latinos/Hispanics?
Would you say you have a lot in common, some in
common, little in common, or nothing at all in
common?

RGPCOMM

Now thinking about things like government services
and employment, political power, and
representation, how much do you have in common
with other Latinos/Hispanics? Would you say you
have a lot in common, some in common, little in
common, or nothing at all in common?

LATCOMM

Thinking about issues like job opportunities,
education or income, how much do Cubans have in
common with other Latinos or Hispanics? Would
you say Cubans share a lot in common, some things
in common, little in common, or nothing in
common with other Latinos?

LATPCOMM

Now thinking about things like government services
and employment, political power and
representation, how much do Cubans have in
common with other Hispanics or Latinos? Would
you say Cubans share a lot in common, some things
in common, little in common, or nothing in
common with other Latinos?

LATFATE

How much does Cubans “doing well” depend on
how other Hispanics or Latinos also doing well? A
lot, some, a little, or not at all?

RESPONSE RANGE

Lot
Some
Little
Nothing
DK/NA

Note: The wording of “Cubans” in the survey questions are dependent on the ethnic
subgroup listed by respondent earlier in the survey. For the observed sample of this
study, all responses to ethnic subgroup listed “Cuban”.
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Table 4.1: Variable Construction for Transnationalism
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

More than once a
month
Once a month

TRCONTCT

How often do you
have contact with
friends and family
in Cuba?

Once every few
months
Once a year
Less Than Once A
Year
Never
More than once a
year
Once a year

Transnational ties

TRVISIT

How often do you
visit Cuba?

Once in the past
three years
Once in the past five
years
Never
More than once a
month
Once a month

TRMONEY

How often do you
send money to
Cuba?

Once every few
months
Once a year
Less than once a
year
Never
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Each variable was selected
based on their ability to
measure the respondent’s
attachment to their
country of origin. All three
variables were collapsed
into a singular composite
variable, then it was
turned into a dummy
variable that measured
whether the respondent
had at least 1 recent
transnational connection,
or none.

Table 4.2: Variable Construction for Post-Mariel Boatlift Arrival
MODEL
VARIABLE

Post-Mariel
boatlift arrival

SURVEY
VARIABLES

ARRIVEUS

SURVEY
QUESTION

When did you first
arrive to live in the
US [mainland]?

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

Numerical
response for
year

A dummy variable was
created, denoting individuals
who arrived prior to 1980 has
having a value of “0” and
individuals who arrived in
1980 or after as “1”.

Table 4.3: Variable Construction for Discrimination
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

DFIRED

Have you ever been
unfairly fired or
denied a job or
promotion?

DBADPOL

Have you ever been
unfairly treated by
the police?

DHOUSING

Have you ever been
unfairly prevented
from moving into a
neighborhood
because the
landlord or a
realtor refused to
sell or rent you a
house or
apartment?

DRESTAUR

Have you ever been
treated unfairly or
badly at
restaurants or
stores?

Discrimination
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RESPONSE
RANGE

No
Yes

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

A composite variable was
created, indicating the total
types of discrimination
faced, from “0” to a
maximum of “4”, meaning
faced each type at least
once. Then, due to the
skewed distribution across
responses, individuals who
faced more than 1 type of
discrimination were
collapsed into a single value.
The final indicators are “no
discrimination faced”, “one
form of discrimination
faced”, and “more than one
form of discrimination
faced”. See Appendix 2 for
more information.

Table 4.4: Variable Construction for Household Income
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

Below $15,000
$15,000-24,999

Household
income

HHINC

Which of the
following best
describes the total
income earned by
all members of
your household
during 2004?

$25,000-34,999
$35,000-44,999

Missing values were
removed, and variable was
otherwise unchanged

$45,000-54,999
$55,000-64,999
Above 65,000

Table 4.5: Variable Construction for Age Group
MODEL
VARIABLE

Age group

SURVEY
VARIABLES

AGE

SURVEY
QUESTION

No question
provided in the
codebook
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RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

Numerical
response for age

Values range from 1 to 6
based on grouped
categories. These values go
from youngest to oldest: 1834, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 6574, 75-84, 84-97. The
grouping was decided with
reference to age grouping
based in past studies,
namely Garcia-Rios and
Barreto (2018).

Table 4.6: Variable Construction for Spanish Media Consumption
MODEL
VARIABLE

Spanish media
consumption

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RELYMED

For information
about public affairs
and politics, would
you say you rely
more heavily on
Spanish-language
television, radio, and
newspapers, or on
English-language
TV, radio, and
newspapers?

RESPONSE
RANGE

English more
Spanish more
Both equally

DATA
TRANSFORMATION
Variable was transformed
into a dummy variable by
making “English more”
responses a value of 0 and
collapsing both “Equal” and
“Spanish” responses into a
value of 1. This was done to
test for the effect of Spanish
fluency and media
environment on
transnationalism.

Table 4.7: Variable Construction for Naturalized Citizen
MODEL
VARIABLE

Naturalized
citizen

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

No

NATUSCIT

Are you a
naturalized
American citizen?
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Yes

DATA
TRANSFORMATION
Response order was recoded
to make “No” responses
valued at 0, and “Yes”
responses as 1. Otherwise,
variable is unchanged.

Table 4.8: Variable Construction for High School Graduate or GED
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

None
Eighth grade or below
Some high school

High school
graduate or GED

REDUC

What is your
highest level of
formal
education
completed?

GED
High school graduate
Some college

A dummy variable was
created, including all
responses coded “GED” and
above as “1”, while “None”,
“Eighth grade or below” and
“Some high school” was
coded as “0”.

4-year college degree
Graduate or
professional degree

Table 4.9: Variable Construction for Some College or More
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

None
Eighth grade or below
Some high school

Some college or
more

REDUC

What is your
highest level of
formal
education
completed?

GED
High school graduate
Some college
4-year college degree
Graduate or
professional degree
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A dummy variable was
created, including all
responses coded “Some
college” and above as “1”,
while all else were coded as
“0”.

Table 4.10: Variable Construction for Open Immigration Preference
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE
Immediate
legalization of current
undocumented
immigrants

Open
Immigration
Preference

IMMPOLICY

What is your
preferred policy
on
undocumented
or illegal
immigration?
Should there
be... (read
responses)

A guest worker
program leading to
legalization eventually
A guest worker
program that permits
immigrants to be in
the country, but only
temporarily
An effort to seal or
close off the border to
stop illegal
immigration

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

Responses that indicated
“None of these” was coded
as missing due to the
inability to determine
position in this scale. The
remaining variables were
reordered to an upwards
scaling ordinal variable,
giving “An effort to close off
the border” a value of “0”, to
a maximum of “3” with
“Immediate legalization”,
which indicated the most
open policy preference
listed.

None of these

Table 4.11: Variable Construction for Republican Identity
MODEL
VARIABLE

Republican
identity

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

Democrat

PARTYID

Generally
speaking, do
you usually
consider
yourself a
Democrat, a
Republican, an
Independent,
some other
party, or what?
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Republican
Independent
Don’t Care
Don’t Know/Other

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

A dummy variable was
created, with all responses
indicating Republican
identity “1”, and all else
being “0”.

Table 4.12: Variable Construction for Economic Immigration
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

Education
Family reunification

Economic
immigration

WHYUS

What would you
say is the main
reason you
came to live in
the United
States?

Escape political
turmoil
My parents brought
me as a child
Improve economic
situation

A dummy variable was
created, with all responses
indicating “improve
economic situation” as “1”,
and all else being “0”. The
“Other” category was
explored to check for
additional economic
responses, however there
were none.

Other (SPECIFY)

Table 4.13: Variable Construction for Light Complexion
MODEL
VARIABLE

Light complexion

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SKNCOLOR

SURVEY
QUESTION

Hispanics/Latinos
can be described
based on skin
tone or
complexion
shades. Using a
scale from 1 to 5
where 1
represents very
dark and 5
represents being
very light, where
would you place
yourself on that
scale?

52

RESPONSE
RANGE

1 Very Dark
2
3
4
5 Very Light

DATA
TRANSFORMATION
A dummy variable was
created, with all responses
indicating a medium (3)
skin tone to very dark (1) as
“0”, while the two highest
responses were counted as
“1”. The justification for
using this variable rather
than race is that when
asked about their race, most
Cuban respondents chose
“other” and simply
reiterated “Latino” or
“Cuban”. This made the
race variable unusable, and
as such, this variable was
used to separate individual
with light complexions from
individuals with medium to
dark complexions.

Table 4.13: Variable Construction for Church Attendance
MODEL
VARIABLE

SURVEY
VARIABLES

SURVEY
QUESTION

RESPONSE
RANGE

DATA
TRANSFORMATION

More than once a
week

Church
attendance

ATTENDCH

How often do
you attend
religious
services? Do
you attend (read
list)

Once a week
Once a month
Only major religious
holidays
Never
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Missing responses were
removed, order was
changed to go from less
frequent to more frequent.

APPENDIX 2: RESPONSE DISTRIBUTION ACROSS VARIABLES
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Table 5.1: Response Distribution for Linked Fate
VARIABLE

Linked fate

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 - None

56

16.42

1 - Little

32

9.38

2 - Some

70

20.53

3 - Lot

132

38.71

Missing

51

14.96

Table 5.2: Response Distribution for Transnational Ties
VARIABLE

Transnational ties

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – No transnational
ties

85

24.93

1 – At least one
transnational tie

235

68.91

Missing

21

6.16
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Table 5.3: Response Distribution for Post-Mariel Boatlift Arrival
VARIABLE

Post-Mariel boatlift
arrival

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – Arrived before
1980

179

52.49

1 – Arrived during or
after 1980

149

43.70

Missing

13

3.81

Table 5.4: Response Distribution for Discrimination
VARIABLE

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – No perceived
discrimination

253

74.19

1 – Experienced one
form of
discrimination

54

15.84

2 – Experienced
multiple forms of
discrimination

18

5.28

Missing

16

4.69

Discrimination
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Table 5.5: Response Distribution for Household Income
VARIABLE

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

1 - Below $15,000

59

17.30

2 -$15,000-24,999

38

15.84

3 - $25,000-34,999

46

11.14

4 - $35,000-44,999

37

10.85

5 - $45,000-54,999

18

5.28

6 - $55,000-64,999

12

3.52

7 - Above $65,000

51

14.96

Missing

80

23.46

Household income
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Table 5.6: Response Distribution for Age Group
VARIABLE

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

1 – Ages 18-34

29

8.50

2 – Ages 35-44

55

16.13

3 - Ages 45-54

112

15.54

4 - Ages 55-64

79

17.30

5 – Ages 65-74

49

23.17

6 - Ages 75-84

43

12.61

7 - Ages 84-97.

9

2.64

Missing

14

4.11

Age group
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Table 5.7: Response Distribution for Spanish Media Consumption
VARIABLE

Spanish Media
Consumption

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – Mostly English
Media Environment

79

23.17

1 – Equal or More
Spanish Media
Environment

257

75.37

Missing

5

1.47

Table 5.8: Response Distribution for High School Graduate or GED
VARIABLE

High school graduate or
GED

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – No

101

29.62

1 – Yes

240

70.38

Missing

0

0
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Table 5.9: Response Distribution for Some College or More
VARIABLE

Some college or more

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – No

242

70.97

1 – Yes

99

29.03

Missing

0

0

Table 5.10: Response Distribution for Republican Identity
VARIABLE

Republican identity

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – Other

215

63.05

1 – Republican

126

36.95

Missing

0

0
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Table 5.11: Response Distribution for Economic immigration
VARIABLE

Economic immigration

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – Other reasons

302

63.05

1 – Economic

39

36.95

Missing

0

0

Table 5.12: Response Distribution for Light Complexion
VARIABLE

Light complexion

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – Medium to dark
skin tone

83

24.34

1 – Light to very
light skin tone

225

65.98

Missing

33

9.68
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Table 5.13: Response Distribution for Church Attendance
VARIABLE

VALUE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

0 – Never

92

26.98

1 – Only major
religious holidays

47

13.78

2 – Once a month

46

13.49

3 – Once a week

97

28.45

4 – More than once
a week

48

14.08

Missing

11

3.23

Church attendance
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